


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


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
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Indonesia-Malaysia: Sukarno's latest moves, including a new "order" to intensify the struggle against Malaysia, seem aimed mainly at pressing the Malaysian Government into new talks.

Malaysian Prime Minister Rahman won a sweeping victory in elections last week following a campaign on the theme that a vote for his party was a vote against Sukarno. Evidently more confident, Rahman on 30 April stated that Sukarno must fulfill completely all Malaysian terms before a new "summit" conference can be held between Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Indonesian officials have reacted to Rahman's success and to the firmer Malaysian line with announcements that their fight against the "puppet state" will continue regardless. At the same time, they are again engaging in a war of nerves, making cryptic reference to the possibility of a real war.

Sukarno is scheduled to make a major "command speech" tomorrow which will be directed particularly toward the "volunteers," allegedly 21 million strong, who registered in March for duty against Malaysia.

The Indonesians presumably believe that if they can create an atmosphere of heightened crisis, the Malaysian Government will be compelled to return to the conference table on Indonesia's terms. The Indonesians not only have rejected Malaysia's demand that they at least begin to withdraw their guerrillas from Malaysian Borneo, but have insisted that "pockets"

Tanganyika-Zanzibar: President Nyerere is elated over the achievement of union with Zanzibar, but he is seriously worried by the prospects ahead.

The new government is considering urgently the assignment of Tanganyikans to key posts on the island. It is moving cautiously, however, to avoid creating the impression of a Tanganyikan takeover. Plans have been made to bring elements of the Zanzibari Army and police to the mainland for training and integration.

Foreign Minister Kambona, who has been the action official handling details of the merger, is, however, scheduled to be away for three weeks. Following his current talks on military and economic aid in Bonn, Kambona plans to visit Cairo and Belgrade.

[Nyerere is more concerned by possible political threats to the union than by immediate security problems. He believes that the new government must prove quickly to the Zanzibaris that union serves their interests, as well as Tanganyika's, by bringing visible economic and social progress.]

The US chargé on Zanzibar believes that resistance to Western aid will continue until the union is fully effective. Vice President Karume is showing little inclination to coordinate closely with Tanganyika now that he is rid of former Foreign Minister Babu.

Karume also is susceptible to pressure from the island's pro-Soviet leaders and to inducements from the many Communist emissaries attending Zanzibar's May Day celebrations. On 29 April, an East German deputy premier spent two hours with Karume discussing increased aid, including the gift of a fully staffed hospital.

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*South Vietnam: The USNS CARD sank at dock-side in Saigon early this morning following the detonation of an underwater explosive apparently set by Viet Cong saboteurs.

There were no casualties among the civilian crew of the 9800-ton ship, a decommissioned US escort carrier serving as an aircraft ferry. The ship had completed unloading a military cargo and was scheduled to leave Saigon for the US later in the day.

The sinking of the CARD is in line with other aggressive Viet Cong actions staged largely for their psychological impact.

Although the sinking may represent only a dramatic move against a target of opportunity, it could presage a more intensive campaign against US personnel and installations.

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NOTES

Ghana: Nkrumah's regime evidently has decided to import Soviet crude oil this year as one means of using a substantial credit that Ghana has built up through its exports, primarily cocoa, to the USSR. Soviet crude--in the amount of 500,000 tons--appeared among proposed USSR exports to Ghana for the first time in the bilateral trade protocol for 1964 signed last January. Established oil companies--including Texaco and Mobiloil--have been limited to half the quantity of crude they had planned to import from their own sources, and reportedly will be expected to market products refined from the Soviet crude.

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Libya: Foreign Minister Maziq has adopted an extremely tough position at the outset of negotiations on the status of Wheelus Air Base. Maziq insisted that the only basis for negotiations is a parliamentary resolution demanding early evacuation of the base. In addition, he vehemently criticized US military and financial aid programs. It is doubtful that Maziq's emotional presentation reflects the position of the King, who recently has been conciliatory on this issue.

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USSR-India: [The Indian steel minister stated in Parliament yesterday that the USSR has offered to help build the 1.5-million-ton first stage of the Bokaro steel plant. He added that a team of Soviet experts will visit India soon to work out details. New Delhi has also been seeking funds for this project in the West and in Japan. The Soviet-assisted steel plant at Bhilai, which Moscow is now expanding to 2.5-million-ton annual capacity, accounts for over one fourth of the \$800 million in economic aid which the USSR has made available to India since 1955.]

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Israel - Arab States: Further tests of Israel's Jordan River project involving the first actual diversion of small amounts of water from the Jordan basin are scheduled to begin possibly as early as tomorrow. At this time, neither Syria nor the other Arab states are likely to do more than denounce the Israeli tests. Progress on the project has been slower than expected, and large-scale withdrawals of water probably will not be possible until much later this year.

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Dominican Republic: Opposition efforts to exploit dissatisfaction over the government's new customs law are creating potential trouble in Santo Domingo for the triumvirate. The most immediate threat is the possibility of a taxi drivers' strike on Monday, ostensibly to protest an increase in the automobile tariff. Leaders of the major opposition political parties and labor organizations claim they would not support such a strike, but some would probably throw their weight behind any promising public protest against the regime.

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*Congo: The Leopoldville government is urgently airlifting additional troops into southeast Kivu Province in the wake of an apparently fairly large-scale terrorist attack on Congo army forces near Uvira on 1 May. Casualties are reported to have been heavy, and Colonel Mulamba, commander of the 3rd Congo Army Groupement, and one of the Congo's most competent officers is reported missing. The specific identity and objectives of the terrorists have not been established.

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The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
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Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
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The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
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